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EFFECTS OF THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC
DRUGS UPON THE REGULATION OF MARIJUANA
Another important reason for becoming a party to the 1961
convention is the marihuana problem .... Several groups in the
United States are loudly agitating to liberalize controls and, in fact,
to legalize its use.
... If the United States becomes a party to the 1961 convention
we will be able to use our treaty obligations to resist legalized use of
marihuana. This discussion is going on all over the country, in many
universities, and in fringe groups, and it is rather disturbing.*
On June 24, 1967, the United States became a party to the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961.1 This multilateral, interna-
tional treaty includes the substance cannabis for the first time as a
subject of international drug control.2  Cannabis is the plant from
which marijuana is produced.3 The ratification of this treaty may
have significant effect upon federal and state marijuana control.
The regulative provisions and general obligations of the Single Con-
vention impose no obligations not currently satisfied in the United
States by the broad coverage of existing federal and state laws.
4
* SENATE COivi. ON FoRIGN RELATIONS, CoNvENTIoN ON NARcoTIc DRUGS,
1961, S. EXEc. REP. No. 11, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1967) (statement of H.J.
Anslinger, former Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics).
1 The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, opened for signature
March 30, 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 50 U.N.T.S. 7515 [hereinafter cited as The
Single Convention]. The treaty received the Senate's advice and consent on
May 8, 1967, without debate. 113 CoNG. REc. 6442 (daily ed. May 8, 1967).
Accession was approved by the President on May 15, 1967; the accession was
deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General on May 25, 1967. The
treaty entered into force for the United States on June 24, 1967, and was
proclaimed by the President on July 12, 1967. T.I.A.S. No. 6298 at 1.
2 CoNvENTIoN ON NARcOTIc DRUGS, 1961, S. ExEc. REP. No. 11, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1967) (statement of James P. Hendrick, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Treasury (for Enforcement)).
3 "Cannabinol, the resin of the cannabis plant [Cannabis sativa (Indian
Hemp) ] which is responsible for its potency as an intoxicating drug, is found
in the flowering tops of the female plant [Cannabis indicia]. It is extracted
from cultivated plants in relatively pure form, known as charas in India,
and used for smoking and eating. Hashish is a powdered and sifted form of
this resin. A less potent preparation is made from the cut tops of the un-
cultivated female plant and contains a relatively low content of resin, which
is known as bhang and used either for drinking as a tea, or as a smoking
mixture. Marihuana is a Mexican name for the equivalent of bhang." D.
MAURER & V. VOGEL, NARcoTIcs Am NARcOTIC ADDIcTIoN 92-94 (1954) [here-
inafter cited as MAURER & VOGEL]. See also Taylor, The Pleasant Assassin:
The Story of Marihuana, in THE MARIHUANA PAPERS 7-10 (D. Solomon ed.
1966).
4 CoNvENTioN ON NARcoTIc DRUGS, 1961, supra note 2, at 12.
"No new Federal legislation for the implementation of the Convention
has been contemplated in view of the broad coverage existing under present
Federal and State laws. If, however, those laws should be found inadequate
to enable fulfillment of this Government's obligations under the Convention,
new Federal legislation will be considered." Letter from Charles I. Bevans,
Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State, to the Author, November 2,
1967, on file in Hastings Law Library.
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The Single Convention's obligations do, however, establish a base
from which the federal government could extend its regulative con-
trols into an area considered formerly to be solely within the juris-
diction of the states.5 The significance of this instrument to those
concerned with marijuana control and possible reduction or termi-
nation of restrictions on this substance is made apparent by exami-
nation of the nature of the obligations created by the treaty and the
nature and scope of the federal treaty-making power.
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is the culmination of
over 60 years of effort on the international level to control traffic
and usage of narcotic and dangerous drugs.6 The Single Convention
is a synthesis of several prior international agreements on narcotic
drug control.7  However, the Single Convention is in some areas
less extensive in coverage than the previous, superseded agree-
ments,8 while in other respects it is more extensive.9 The extension
of international drug control by the Single Convention to cannabis is
of fundamental concern to this discussion.
The objective of the Single Convention is to establish a universal
instrument of international cooperation and control, limiting drug
traffic and use to medical and scientific purposes.' 0 This is to be
5 See notes 60-64 infra and accompanying text.
0 Bevans, International Conventions in the Field of Narcotic Drugs, 37
TEmp. L.Q. 41 (1963). The Single Convention was the result of some 13
years' effort by the United Nations Economic and Social Council to con-
solidate operation and effect of the various prior international agreements
on narcotics control. In January 1961, a conference was convened in New
York City to study the Third Draft of the Single Convention put forward by
the Economic and Social Council's Commission on Narcotic Drugs. After
considerable revision, the Single Convention was opened for signature on
March 30, 1961. Id. at 53-54; see CONVENTION ON NARcoTic DRUGS, 1961, S.
ExEc. Doc. G, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at v (1967) (letter of submittal from
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State, to the President, Feb-
ruary 15, 1967).
7 The Single Convention lists the prior treaties it partly or completely
supersedes at article 44. For a good discussion of the prior treaties, see
Bevans, supra note 6.
8 The Single Convention contains no provision for a "closed-list" of
nations authorized to produce opium as was provided in the 1936 and 1953
treaties. Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, supra note 2, at 7; Bevans,
supra note 6, at 54. Under articles 49 and 50 of the Single Convention,
parties may reserve the right to suspend immediate implementation of cer-
tain of the provisions of the treaty in their territory. CoNVENTioN oN NAR-
cozc DRUGS, 1961, supra note 2, at 10. U.S. accession was withheld for 6
years until it was decided that despite these less extensive factors the treaty
was still a valuable document. CONVENTION ON NARcoTIc DRUGS, 1961, S.
ExEc. Doc. G, supra note 6, at v.
9 The inclusion of provisions for treatment of addicts in article 38 of
the Single Convention and the inclusion of cannabis and cocabush plants and
derivatives as objects of international concern in article 2 of the Single Con-
vention make the Single Convention more inclusive than the prior treaties.
See Bevans, supra note 6, at 56; CONVENTION ON NARcoTIc DRUGS, supra note
3, at 18.
10 The Single Convention, Preamble.
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achieved by the restriction of drug manufacture and traffic to a
system of quotas based on the medical and scientific needs of the
parties.11
The drugs and preparations are arranged into four schedules
with different measures of control applicable to each schedule.
Cannabis is included in schedule I as one of the drugs to which the
general regulative provisions of the treaty are to apply.12 Cannabis
is also included in schedule IV, a listing of the most dangerous
drugs.' 3 For this schedule it is recommended that additional, special
control measures should be adopted by the parties, extending, if
necessary for the protection of public health and welfare, to prohibi-
tion of manufacture, traffic or use of the drugs, except for medical
and scientific research.14 The criterion of being "particularly liable
to abuse and to produce ill effects ... not offset by substantial thera-
peutic advantages"'15 apparently was the basis used for placing canna-
bis in this most stringently regulated category.16
In addition, article 28 of the Single Convention pertains espec-
ially to the control of cannabis. Cultivation of the cannabis plant
for the production of cannabis or cannabis resin is to be highly re-
stricted,17 and misuse of and illicit traffic in the leaves of the canna-
bis plant are to be prevented by whatever measures necessary.' 8
The restrictions are not to apply to cultivation intended exclu-
sively for industrial or horticultural purposes.19
The responsibility for controlling international drug use and
supply is placed in the International Control Board.20  Annual esti-
mates of drug consumption 2' and statistics concerning various phases
11 See notes 20-24 infra and accompanying text.
12 The Single Convention, art. 2, para. 1.
13 CONVENTION ON NARcoTic DRUGS, 1961, S. ExEc. Doc. G, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 56 (1967). Schedule IV also includes heroin, ketobenindone, and
desomorphine. Id. at 40.
14 The Single Convention, art. 2, para. 5.
15 Id., art. 3, para. 5.
16 Id. Paragraph 5 of article 3 of the Single Convention provides for
adding substances to schedule IV on this basis. A report to the Conference
on the Convention stated:
"The prohibition or regulation of the use of a drug representing a particu-
larly high danger to the community should continue to be recommended
by international organs concerned, but should not be mandatory." United
Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, TheQuestion of Cannabis, E/CN.7/399 at 4 (1960); see MAURER & VOGEL 96 (can-
nabis medically an unimportant drug). But cf. Walton, Therapeutic Applica-
tion of Marihuana, in THE MARiHuNA PAPERS 394 (D. Solomon ed. 1966).
17 The Single Convention, art. 28, para. 1.
18 Id., para. 3.
19 Id., para. 2.
20 The International Control Board is to be established pursuant to
articles 5, 9-15 of the Single Convention. It will replace the Permanent
Central Narcotics Board and the Drug Supervisory Body of the prior inter-
national agreements on March 2, 1968, pursuant to article 45 of the Single
Convention. CONVENTION ON NARcoTIc DRUGS, 1961, S. ExEc. Doc. G, supra
note 6, at vi.
21 The Single Convention, art. 19: The parties are to furnish annual
estimates in respect of the following matters: (1) quantities of drugs to be
Con$.umed for medical and scientific purposes;- (2) quantities to b(. used in
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of drug activity22 are to be furnished by the parties to the Control
Board. The total quantity of each drug manufactured or imported
by any country is not to exceed the sum of the following: (1) the
quantity consumed for medical and scientific purposes; (2) the
amount used to manufacture less harmful, non-regulated drugs; (3)
the quantity exported; (4) the amount necessary to bring supply
in stock to relevant estimate levels; and (5) the quantity acquired
for special purposes..2 3 The Control Board is authorized to prohibit
exports to a country whose manufacture and importation exceeds the
established estimates.24
The parties obligate themselves to take such legislative and ad-
ministrative measures as may be necessary to give effect to and
carry out the convention; to cooperate with other states in exe-
cuting the provisions of the convention; and "to limit exclusively to
medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export,
import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs.' '25
The manufacture,26 trade and distribution,27 as well as importa-
tion and exportation 28 of the regulated substances are to be con-
trolled either by the licensing of private companies or by the restric-
tion of these activities to state enterprises. Exports to other coun-
tries are prohibited, except those both in accordance with the export-
ing country's laws and within the quota limitations established pursu-
ant to the Single Convention.29  Subject to their constitutional limi-
tations, the parties are to ensure that acts contrary to the provisions
of the Single Convention are to be punishable criminal offenses. 30
Present Regulation of Marijuana
The obligations set forth in the Single Convention are currently
satisfied in the United States by the combination of federal and
state regulations on the manufacture, traffic, and use of marijuana. 31
manufacturing less harmful substances; (3) quantities of stocks to be held
on hand; and (4) quantities necessary for special stocks.
22 Id., art. 20: The parties are to provide annual statistics in respect of
the following matters: (1) production of drugs; (2) utilization of drugs for
manufacture of less harmful substances; (3) consumption of drugs; (4) im-
ports and exports of drugs; (5) seizure and disposal of drugs; and (6) stocks
of drugs on hand.
23 Id., art. 21, para. 1.
24 Id., para. 4.
25 Id., art. 4 (emphasis added).
26 Id., art. 29.
27 Id., art. 30.
28 Id., art. 31.
29 Id., para. 1. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the regulatory quota system.
30 Id., art. 36: "[Clultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, prep-
aration, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale,
delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch in transit, transport,
importation and exportation of drugs" are the activities explicitly listed by
article 36 to be criminally punishable when not in accord with the Conven-
tion's provisions. Article 37 provides that drug substances and equipment
used for commission of offenses referred to in article 36 are to be liable to
seizure and confiscation.
,31 See letter from Charles I. Bevans, note 4 supra.
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Federal legislation for the regulation of drugs has been principally
based upon the federal government's powers to levy taxes32 and regu-
late commerce.33 Penalty provisions in regulatory revenue and com-
merce measures in the drug field have been upheld as valid exer-
cises of federal power.34 A regulatory tax scheme was imposed on
marijuana in 1937.35 Importation of narcotics 36 and marijuna 37 has
been greatly restricted by legislation pursuant to the federal power
to regulate foreign commerce. 8 Strict penalty provisions for posses-
sion of illegally imported marijuana are an important element of
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
34 The initial regulatory act in the drug field was the Harrison Anti-
Narcotics Act of 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1919), pertaining to opiates. The
act was held to be a valid revenue measure, notwithstanding that its effect
might be to accomplish another purpose as well as raise revenue, and that
the supposed motivation for its enactment was to regulate drugs in a manner
that could be accomplished by the police power of the states. United States
v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1919); accord, Alston v. United States, 274
U.S. 289, 294 (1927); Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 335-54 (1928); see
United States v. Contrades, 196 F. Supp. 803, 811-12 (D. Hawaii 1961).
35 Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, ch. 533, 50 Stat. 551. The present revenue
provisions are in INT. REv. CODE or 1954, §§ 4741-46 (transfer tax), and
4751-57 (occupational tax). The present penalties for violation of revenue
provisions are found in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7237. Under this section,
where no specific penalty is provided, an offense is to be punished by not
less than 2 years or more than 10 years imprisonment and up to $20,000 fine;
for a second offense, 5 to 10 years imprisonment and up to $20,000 fine; for
a third and subsequent offense, 10 to 40 years imprisonment and up to $20,000
fine are to be assessed. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7237 (a). Sale or transfer
of marijuana without the requisite written order, prohibited by INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 4742(a), is to be punished by 5 to 20 years imprisonment
and up to $20,000 fine; the penalties are increased to 10 to 40 years for sub-
sequent offenses, or where the transferee is under 18 years old. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 7237(b).
"On its face the statute [Marihuana Tax Act of 1937J authorizes trans-
actions between persons, such as importers, wholesalers, physicians, and
others, who have paid certain occupational and transfer taxes. But in fact,
since there is no accepted medical use of marihuana, only a handful of
people are registered under the law, and for all practical purposes the drug
is illegal. Unauthorized possession, which in this context means possession
under almost any circumstances, is a criminal act under the Federal tax
law." PRESIDENT'S CoiMnMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMInNIsTRATION
or JUsTicE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIVE IN A FREE SOCIETY 214 (1967) [herein-
after cited as PREsIDENT's CommissIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT].
United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950), upheld the Marihuana Tax
Act of 1937. The regulatory measures were held not to be invalid even
though they regulated, discouraged or deterred the activities taxed; or be-
cause the revenue was negligible; or because the act affected activities Con-
gress might not otherwise control. Id. at 44.
36 21 U.S.C. §§ 171-85 (1964).
37 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964). Importing or trafficking in imported mari-
juana contrary to law is punishable by 5 to 20 years imprisonment and up
to $20,000 fine. Id. Possession of marijuana is deemed sufficient evidence
to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains his possession to the
satisfaction of the jury. Id; see Williams v. United States, 290 F.2d 451 (9th
Cir. 1961).
38 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
[Vol. 19THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
NARCOTIC DRUG CONVENTION
this legislation. 39 Interstate transportation of marijuana upon which
no tax has been paid is also illegal.40 In addition to the regulations
based on the taxing and commerce powers, direct federal restrictions
and prohibitions on narcotic drug manufacture and distribution 41
have been founded on the power of Congress to enact legislation
necessary to implement the obligations of executory treaties.
42
Narcotics and marijuana are regulated at the state level through
the police power.43 The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, in force in
all states except California and Pennsylvania, 44 makes unauthorized
manufacture, possession, control, sale, prescription, administration, or
compounding of any narcotic drug illegal.45 Marijuana is included as
a narcotic drug in this act.46 Unauthorized transportation, addiction,
or use are not included under the restrictions of the Uniform Act.
Such activities are, however, subject to control under the state po-
lice power.47 In addition to the Uniform Act, some states provide
for misdemeanor penalties for marijuana use.48 The California 49 and
Pennsylvania" statutes are regarded to be at least as effective as
the provisions of the Uniform Act.51
39 Note 35 supra.
40 INT. REv. CODE or 1954, § 4755(b).
41 For example, opium poppy growing, except under federal license lim-
ited to scientific and medical purposes, was forbidden by the Opium Control
Act of 1942, 21 U.S.C. §§ 188-88n (1964). This act was held to be a consti-
tutionally valid implementation of the obligation to control production of
opium pursuant to 1912 and 1931 international opium conventions in Stutz v.
Bureau of Narcotics, 56 F. Supp. 810, 812-13 (N.D. Cal. 1944), which is the
first judicial application of the doctrine of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920) (discussed note 64 infra), to legislation pursuant to treaties in the
field of narcotic drug control. Anslinger, The Implementation of Treaty
Obligations in Regulating the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, 8 Am. U.L. REV. 112,
113 (1959).
42 See notes 73-78 infra and accompanying text.
43 Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921), stated
that there is no question of the authority of the states in exercise of the state
police power to regulate traffic or use of dangerous and habit forming drugs.
Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962). See also People v. Glaser,
238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 825-26, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1965); State v. Richard,
245 La. 465, 158 So. 2d 828 (1963); State v. Martin, 192 La. 704, 189 So. 109
(1939).
44 9B UNIFORm LAWS ANNOTATED 409 (1967 Supp).
4j5 UNIFORm NARCoTIc DRUG ACT 8 2.
46 Uiu OmrVi NARCOTIC DRUG ACT 8 1(14).
47 See In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963); State v. Reed, 34 N.J. 554, 170 A.2d 419 (1961);
cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962); Minnesota ex rel. Whipple
v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 44 (1921).
48 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 170-8 (Supp. 1966) (persons using or under
the influence of any narcotic drug defined under the Uniform Narcotic Drug
Act, which includes marijuana, is a disorderly person); see State v. Reed, 34
N.J. 554, 170 A.2d 419 (1961).
49 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11530-32.
50 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, c. 6, §§ 780-1 to -31 (1964). Marijuana is de-
fined as a narcotic drug under § 780-2(g) (3). Possession, sale and various
types of trafficking in narcotics are prohibited under § 780-4(q); under §
780-4(r), unauthorized use of narcotics is prohibited.
51 MAURER & VOGEL, supra note 3, at 198.
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California marijuana proscription is based on a prohibition of
unauthorized marijuana cultivation or possession; violation is pun-
ishable as a felony by imprisonment for 1 to 10 years.52 Possession
for unauthorized sale, transportation, unauthorized sale, and supply-
ing marijuana to minors are more severely punished.5 3 Marijuana
also comes within the general regulations on narcotics,5 4 such as
illegal narcotics use, being under the influence of narcotics,55 or be-
ing in a room where narcotics are being used.55
It is the combination of federal and state regulation that estab-
lishes an effective proscriptive system as to the recreational use
7 of
marijuana. Since the prohibitive enactments of the states allow vir-
tually no legitimate use of marijuana, it is unreasonable to expect
compliance with the federal regulations, as there is no lawful ac-
tivity upon which the tax may be paid.5 8 Accordingly, the effect of
the federal taxing and import restrictions as a regulative device
would be weakened by the elimination of state marijuana proscrip-
tions.5 9
If the state proscriptions were revoked or drastically revised,
additional federal measures would be necessary to maintain the cur-
rent level of control on activities related to the use of marijuana.
But in this regard, the United States Supreme Court has suggested
that direct federal restrictions on narcotics and marijuana would be
52 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.
53 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.5 (possession for sale, 2 to 10 years
imprisonment; no parole or release until 2 years served); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11531 (transportation or sale, 5 years to life imprisonment; no
parole or release until 3 years served); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11532
(sale to minors, 10 years to life imprisonment; no parole or release until 5
years served).
54 For Division 10 of the California Health & Safety Code on Narcotics,
marijuana, its derivatives or compounds, is included under the definition for
narcotics. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11001.
55 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 makes use or being under the
influence of narcotics a misdemeanor offense. "The 'use' part of the statute
is rarely enforced. Although the accused may be using the drug, if he pos-
sesses it he will be tried under the felony provisions of § 11530; if he does
not possess the drug but is 'under its influence,' he will be tried under §
11721." Boyko & Rotberg, Constitutional Objections to California's Marihuana
Possession Statute, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 773, 785 n.63 (1967).
56 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11556.
57 The term "recreational use" herein denotes the use of marijuana for
religious and psychological, as well as pleasurable experiences.
58 See quotation from PRESIDENT'S CoIVIVussioN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
214, supra note 35.
59 U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERv., PuBLic HEALTH REPS., Supp. No. 91, STATE
LAWS RELATING TO THE CONTROL OF NARcOTIc DRUGS AND THE TREATN oF
DRUG ADDIcTION 34 (1931).
"In conclusion it may be stated that a successful solution to the narcotic
drug problem is dependent upon the enactment of efficient and adequate
State laws authorizing the control of habit-forming narcotic drugs and the
scientific treatment of persons enmeshed in the drug habit.
"Without such legislation the Federal anti-narcotic law cannot serve to,
nor was it designed to, stop the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and the evil
of narcotic addiction." Id.
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an infringement on the residual powers of the states.60 Subsequent
to this dicta, however, the scope of the power of the federal govern-
ment to regulate interstate commerce has been greatly expanded,61
and might now serve as the basis for legislation directly prohibiting
traffic in marijuana.6 2  However, the constitutional scope of such
60 Direct federal restrictions as to narcotics or marijuana are discussed
as being outside the purview of congressional power in cases upholding nar-
cotics and marijuana taxing regulations. In United States v. Sanchez, 340
U.S. 42, 44 (1950), the marijuana tax was not invalidated because it affected
activities Congress "might not otherwise regulate." In Nigro v. United States,
276 U.S. 332, 341 (1928), the Court stated:
"In interpreting the [Revenue Act of Dec. 17, 1914 ch. 1, § 1, 38 Stat. 785],
we must assume that it is a taxing measure, for otherwise it would be no law
at all. If it is a mere act for the purpose of regulating and restraining the
purchase of the opiate and other drugs, it is beyond the power of Congress
and must be regarded as invalid, just as the Child Labor Act of Congress was
held to be .... " See Alston v. United States, 274 U.S. 289, 294 (1927);
United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1919).
"The Federal decisions in which the constitutionality of this type of leg-
islation [regulatory taxes] has been raised contain numerous statements ex-
pressly or tacitly holding or assuming that Congress would be without power
to prohibit or regulate a purely intrastate transaction in narcotics not linked
in some way with foreign or interstate commerce or taxation." United States
v. Contrades, 196 F. Supp. 803, 811-12 (D. Hawaii 1961) (dictum) (footnote
omitted).
61 Discussing the occasion for use of treaties instead of executive agree-
ments where there is a possibility of affecting reserved powers of the states,
Byrd comments:
"The question immediately arises ... as to what powers are reserved to
the states .... At one point in constitutional history, for example, the com-
merce power of Congress does not extend to the regulation of child labor, and
such regulation is reserved to the states; [Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918)] at another point in constitutional history the commerce power of
Congress does extend so far [United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) ].
Some authorities argue that there should be nothing reserved to the states,
that indeed the Founding Fathers intended this and that the Tenth Amend-
ment comprised words signifying nothing, because all powers had been dele-
gated [W. CROSSEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1953) ]. But all commentators agree that as a matter of legal
fact, whatever the ideas of the Founders, some powers are still reserved to
the states .... Thus, the definition of powers belonging to the federal gov-
eminent and to the states is always in flux, but by definition some powers
are reserved to the states as long as an arrangement of constitutionally dis-
tributed powers exist; when all agree that no powers are reserved to the
states, then all will agree that the United States has developed into a unitary
form of government, at least from the viewpoint of supremacy." E. BYRD, JR.,
TREATIES AND EXEcUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 134 (1960) [herein-
after cited as BYRD].
62 The question of the proper relationship of the residual powers of the
state governments to the congressional power to prohibit interstate shipment
of articles whose use in the state of destination might reasonably be con-
ceived to be "injurious to the public health, morals, or welfare" arose in
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147 (1938). Therein
prohibition of interstate shipment of filled milk was seen not to be a "for-
bidden invasion of state power either because its motive or its consequence
[was] to restrict the use of articles of commerce within the states of destina-
tion," or that the "exertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce ...
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direct federal regulation, and its effectiveness in conjunction with
revenue and importation regulations as a substitute for state pro-
scriptions, need not be considered. The problem of infringement on
the residual powers of the state governments could be avoided by
founding legislation directly regulating the use of marijuana on the
obligations of the Single Convention.63 Federal measures based upon
the treaty power are more clearly established as predominant over
the residual powers of the states than are federal measures based
upon powers expressly granted to Congress. 4
The Treaty-Making Power
The treaty-making power 5 of the federal government is broad
in scope and far-reaching in effect 6 Once a subject is established
is attended by the same incidents which attend the police power of the states."
Id.
Interstate transportation of marijuana upon which no tax has been paid
is prohibited under current laws. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4755; note 40
supra and accompanying text.
63 The obligations of the Single Convention to limit production, traffic
and use of cannabis to medical and scientific purposes, as established by arti-
cles 4, 19-21, and possibly to prohibit the production, traffic, and use of can-
nabis if seen as necessary, as established in article 2, could be used as the
foundation for direct federal laws. See notes 14, 18, 25-30, supra and accom-
panying text.
64 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), established that Congress
might legislate as to treaty obligations on matters with which an act of Con-
gress might not otherwise deal without invading powers reserved to the states.
The case argued that the tenth amendment applies only to restrict federal
contravention of prohibitory statements of the Constitution. Id. at 433. The
treaty power was delegated to the federal government with nothing residual
in the states. Id. at 432-435. Congress could pass all laws necessary and
proper to execute this power of the federal government, not contrary to pro-
hibitory words of the Constitution. A treaty may override the state power
to control "the great body of private relations that usually fall within the
control of the State . . . 2" Id. at 434. This doctrine was applied to the field
of narcotics treaties for the first time in Stutz v. Bureau of Narcotics, 56 F.
Supp. 810 (N.D. Cal. 1944). See note 41 supra. "In light of the Court's deci-
sion in State of Missouri v. Holland [252 U.S. 416 (1920)] .... the holding
and dictum in the Stutz [56 F. Supp. 810 (N.D. Cal. 1944)] and Eramdjian
[155 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Cal. 1957)] cases, and the very strong undertakings
on the part of the United States in the various treaties and conventions relat-
ing to the control of narcotic drugs, there appears to be more than a plausible
ground today . . . for justifying congressional regulation of intrastate trans-
actions in narcotics without tying the same to illegal importation or exporta-
tion, or the exercise of the taxing power, but the question is not entirely free
from doubt . . . ." United States v. Contrades, 196 F. Supp. 803, 812 (D.
Hawaii 1961) (dictum) (emphasis added). The Congressional statement of
purpose for the enactment of the Narcotics Manufacturing Act of 1960, 21
U.S.C. §§ 501-09 (1964), illustrates reliance on fulfilling treaty obligations as
a basis for legislation directly licensing and controlling manufacture of nar-
cotics. 21 U.S.C. § 501(4)-(5) (1964).
65 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (the President shall have the power to
make treaties with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate). U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2 (all treaties made under the authority of the United States are
the supreme law of the land).
66 See generally, BYRD, supra note 60; Note, Treaty Law of the United
States, 14 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 602 (1965).
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as a matter of international negotiation between the United States
and other nations, it is a concern within the scope of the treaty-
making power.67 Concerns under the treaty power are not limited
by the concept of residual state powers.6 8 Thus, the matter is within
the exclusive purview of the states only until an assertion of the
federal interest is made by international negotiation and the result-
ant treaty.6 9
The courts have divided treaties into two classes: self-executing
and executory.70 Self-executing treaties become internal law upon
ratification and are considered the law of the land,7 1 equivalent to
an act of Congress. 72 An executory treaty contemplates future leg-
islative action by the signatory parties.7 3 Before such a treaty be-
comes internal law, Congress must pass implementing legislation. 74
However, Congress cannot be compelled to implement an executory
treaty.7 5 Until implementing legislation is enacted, the negotiated
international promise remains inchoate as to internal effect.7 6 Once
Congress decides to implement a treaty, it has the power to make
all necessary laws for carrying a treaty into execution.77 Congres-
sional determination that such legislation is appropriately related to
the discharge of this constitutional power is sufficient for finding
67 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890); in re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 463 (1890); see Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
68 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Asakura v. City of Seattle,
265 U.S. 232, 341 (1924); see Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890). For
discussion of the relation of the treaty power to the residual powers of the
states, see BYRD 98-110, 129-135. See also note 63 supra and accompanying
text.
69 Henlin, The Treaty-Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the
Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 909-10 (1959).
70 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 214 (1829); see S. CRANDALL,
TREATIES: THEiR MAKING AW ENFORCEMENT 162 (2d ed. 1916) for judicial
history [hereinafter cited as CRANDALL]. But see W. COWLES, TP ETIEs AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROPERTY INTERFERENCE AND DUE PROCESS Or LAW 301
(1941) (advocating recognition of a third category of treaties) [hereinafter
cited as COWLES].
71 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 fall.) 199, 235 (1796); see, e.g., Valentine v.
United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936); Asakura v. City of
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 241 (1924); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434-35
(1920); Strother v. Lucas, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 410, 439 (1838).
72 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see COWLES 1.
73 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); accord, Sei Fujii v.
State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 721, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (1952).
74 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.
2d 718, 722, 242 P.2d 617, 621 (1952); CRANDALL 162-63; see H. Steiner, Constitu-
tional Limitations Upon the Treaty-making Power 29, June 1928 (unpublished
thesis in the University of California Library, Berkeley, California) [herein-
after cited as Steiner Thesis]. The judicial criterion as to a treaty provision be-
ing self-executing is the appearance of the intention of the signatory parties to
prescribe a rule that standing alone would be enforceable in the courts, man-
ifested by the instrument's language. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 721-
22, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (1952); see CRANDALL 163.
75 Steiner Thesis 29; see BYRD 144.
76 Steiner Thesis 29.
77 Stutz v. Bureau of Narcotics, 56 F. Supp. 810, 813 (N.D. Cal. 1944).
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such legislation constitutionally valid.7 8
The relationship of treaties and the powers derived therefrom to
the general constitutional scheme has been a source of controversy.79
The courts have yet to state that a treaty is invalid because it vio-
lates the Constitution.8 0 However, there have been dicta stating that
upon finding treaty provisions violative of the Constitution, the court
would declare such provisions of the instrument invalid.81 A few
examples of the invalidation of congressional acts designed to im-
plement treaties, resulting in non-effectuation of the particular treaty
provisions, have been noted.
8 2
No specific provision is made in the Constitution for applying to
the treaty power the limitations of guarantees of personal rights
generally applied to the power of the federal government.8 3 It has
been argued that even though these limitations as expressed apply to
specific branches of the government, they were intended to apply to
each branch not independently, but as a part of the total system of
federal government.84 A further substantiation of the position that
treaties contrary to constitutional prohibitions are void is found in
Reid v. Covert. 5 The Court there stated that the provisions of the
78 Id.
"The competency of the United States to enter into treaty stipulations
with foreign powers designed to establish, through appropriate legislation, an
internationally effective system of control over the production and distribu-
tion of habit forming drugs is not questioned .... And Congress is constitu-
tionally empowered to enact whatever legislation is necessary and proper for.
carrying into execution the treaty making power of the United States. U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 8.
. The constitutionality of the measures thus chosen by Congress to
give efficacy to the treaty stipulations of the Convention is not dependent
upon the wisdom or success of the choice .... The power of Congress to
enact such legislation as is necessary or proper to carry into execution
powers vested by the Constitution in the United States, of which the treaty
making power is one, includes the right to employ any legislative measures
appropriately adapted to the effective exercise of those powers. Juilhiard v.
Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 .... So long as a rationally sound basis exists for
the congressional determination that particular legislation is appropriately
related to the discharge of constitutional powers, the validity of such legis-
lation is unassailable." Id.
79 BYRD 83-87; Note, Treaty Law of the United States, 14 INT'L & ComP.
L.Q. 602, 606 (1965). See generally, CowLEs 14-15, discussing this as a ques-
tion of "depth" of treaty making power rather than of "scope".
80 BYRD 86; Note, Treaty Law of the United States, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
602, 606 (1965).
81 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6, 16 (1957); Wilson v. Girard,
354 U.S. 524, 530 (1957); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924);
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,
267 (1890); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21 (1870); Doe
v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853). For a statement that the discus-
sions in the above cases amount to more than mere dicta, see CowLES 295.
82 BYRD 86-88 (citing New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.)
662 (1836); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1859)); see Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1957). See also CowLEs 176.
83 Steiner Thesis 12.
84 Id. at 13.
85 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of federal power,
including the treaty-making power.86
Effects of the Treaty on Current Marijuana Problems
Though the Single Convention is an executory treaty,8 7 no new
legislation stemming from its obligations is foreseeable, with the cur-
rent federal-state regulation system on marijuana in effect.8  The
Single Convention "imposes no obligations not already being satis-
fied by the United States."8 9 The importance of the Single Conven-
tion develops upon consideration of possible future changes in state
marijuana regulations, 0 necessitating further federal legislation.91
Recent criticism of the system proscribing the use of marijuana
has engendered a controversy from which modifications of state reg-
ulative policies might result.92 The ultimate outcome of this con-
troversy can only be conjectured. The regulations on marijuana use
tantamount to prohibition have been criticized as inappropriate to the
nature of the substance 93 and ineffective as a deterrent to illicit use.9 4
86 Id. at 16-19. See generally BYRD 89-98. The "inherent power" doc-
trine of United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936),
placing treaties outside and above the Constitution is seen as effectively con-
tained by Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1942), and Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957). BYD 98.
87 See note 74 supra for criterion for finding a treaty self-executing or
executory. Article 4 of the Single Convention illustrates the intent of the
parties to enact implementing legislation to execute the provisions of the
treaty. Note 25 supra and accompanying text; see Anslinger, The Implementa-
tion of Treaty Obligations in Regulating the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, 8 Am.
U.L. Ray. 112, 116 (1959).
88 Letter from Charles I. Bevans, supra note 4.
89 CoNvENTioN ON NARcoTIc DRUGS, 1961, supra note 2, at 12.
90 Because federal legislation subsequent to a treaty prevails over con-
trary treaty provisions, the treaty does not affect procedurally the changes
possible in federal laws. See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco; 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
616, 621 (1871); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884) (affirmed in
some 20 later cases: BYRD 82-83 n.7). Just as Congress may pass laws con-
trary to previous laws, Congress may enact laws contrary to existing treaties,
albeit the international obligation goes unfulfilled. Steiner Thesis 29.
91 See Letter from Charles I. Bevans, supra note 4; notes 59-61 supra and
accompanying text.
92 See generally THE ARuuHuAxA PAPERS (D. Solomon ed. 1966); PRisi-
DENT'S CoMvvnSsioN ON LAw ENFORCEMENT, supra note 35, at 224-25; PRESi-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG ABUSE 12 (1967); Report of the
Assembly Interim Comm. on Criminal Procedure on. Narcotics Control, 22
CAL. ASSEMBLY INTERIM Comvm. REPS. 1965-1967, No. 9, at 16-17 (1967); Boyko
& Rotberg, Constitutional Objections to California's Marihuana Possession
Statute, 14 U.C.L.A.L. RE. 773 (1967).
93 Lindesmith, The Marihuana Problem, in THE MARIHUANA PAPERS 30
(D. Solomon ed. 1966); McGlothlin, Cannabis: A Reference, in THE MAmmANA
PAPERS 414 (D. Solomon ed. 1966); Solomon, Editor's Forward to THE MARi-
HuANA PAPERS xxi (D. Solomon ed. 1966); see Boyko & Rotberg, Constitutional
Objections to California's Marihuana Possession Statute, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
773 (1967).
94 Report of the Assembly Interim Comm. on Criminal Procedure on
Narcotcs Control, supra note 92, at 11.
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A policy similar to that for regulating the use of alcohol has been
suggested.9 5 The harshness of the penalties imposed for violation of
marijuana regulations, especially possession, has also been criticized.""
Proposals that penalties for mere possession be reduced to misde-
meanor degree have been suggested as an alternative to complete
elimination of proscriptive legislation.9 7 State marijuana proscrip-
tions are also attacked as infringements on personal freedoms guar-
anteed by the Federal Constitution.9 8  These constitutional ques-
tions would not be avoided by basing similar federal proscriptions
on the obligation to fulfill treaty obligations.99
The outcome of the foregoing debate notwithstanding, Congress
apparently has gained a more direct source of power to legislate in
the field of marijuana regulation than it had prior to the ratification
of the Single Convention. It will be Congress that decides whether
the treaty's obligations are being fulfilled and whether implement-
ing legislation is desirable. 0 0 If found to be expedient, Congress
could enact legislation extending federal regulation to intrastate trans-
actions in marijuana'01 that could include prohibition of use beyond
scientific and medical research. 0 2 Without repeal 0 3 of the treaty or
amendment of the treaty by international procedure, 04 the obliga-
tions of the Single Convention-and the federal power resulting
therefrom-will be an important element in the future of marijuana
regulation.
Apparently, federal marijuana controls based upon the taxing
and commerce powers are at the moment confined by constitutional
limitations. But possible legislation based upon treaty obligations
could be much wider in scope and effect, extending to intrastate mat-
ters. 0 5 In this respect, at least, the Single Convention must be
95 See note 93, supra.
96 See Boyko & Rotberg, supra note 92; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS
AND DRUG ABUSE 12 (1967); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT,
supra note 35, at 225.
97 See Comment, The California Marijuana Possession Statute: An In-
fringement on the Right of Privacy or Other Peripheral Constitutional Rights?,
19 HASTINGS L.J. 758, 760 (1968).
98 Boyxo & ROTBERG, supra note 92; Comment, supra note 97. But see
People v. Glaser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 824-26, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427, 431-32 (1963).
99 See notes 79-86 supra and accompanying text.
100 See notes 73-78 supra and accompanying text.
101 See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
102 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
103 BYRD 144; CRANDALL 465 (act of Congress approved by the President
may terminate operation of a prior treaty as a law binding on the courts).
104 Amendments to the Single Convention must be proposed by parties
to the treaty. The texts and reasons for adoption are to be communicated
to the Secretary-General who is to communicate them to the parties and the
Economic and Social Council. The Council may decide either to call a con-
ference to consider the proposed amendment, or ask the parties whether they
accept the proposed amendment. With no rejection by any party within 18
months, the proposed amendment enters into force; if rejected by any party,
the Council is to decide whether to call a conference to consider the matter.
The Single Convention, art. 47, paras. 1-2.
105 See CowLs 11.
[Vol. 19
March 1968] NARCOTIC DRUG CONVENTION 861
acknowledged as an enlargement of the federal power to regulate
drugs. An extensive authority is accordingly placed in the federal
government to prohibit the use of marijuana.
David Murray Van Atta*
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